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COMMENTS I
The Delaware Debate on Takeover
Legislation: No Small Wonder
Meanwhile the little community of truck-farmers and
clamdiggers have had their cupidity excited by the spectacle of
their northern neighbor, New Jersey, becoming rich and bloated
through the granting of franchises to trusts which are to do busi-
ness everywhere except in New Jersey, and which are to go forth
panoplied by the sovereign state of New Jersey to afflict and
curse other American communities . . . . In other words little
Delaware, gangrened with envy at the spectacle of the truck-
patchers, sand-duners, clam-diggers and mosquito wafters of
New Jersey getting all the money in the country into her coffers,
- is determined to get her little tiny, sweet, round baby hand
into the grab-bag of sweet things before it is too late."
I. Introduction
In the twentieth century, Delaware has emerged as the "juris-
diction of choice" for business incorporations in the United States.
One-half of the Fortune 500 and 40 percent of the companies listed
on the New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware.'
Attempts by other states to emulate the success of the Delaware
General Corporation Laws in attracting corporate charter business
have been unsuccessful. Bayless Manning, an eminent legal scholar
and practitioner, recently stated: "I suggest that we now have a na-
tional corporate law - Delaware law."4
1. Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts, 33 AM. L. REV. 418,
419 (1899), quoted in Comment, Law For Sale: A Study Of The Delaware Corporation Law
Of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 861 (1969).
2. Delaware Fails to Adopt Law on Takeovers, Wall St. J., June 16, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
4. State Competition. Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 783 (1987). See also
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665
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It is hardly surprising that the eyes of corporate America fo-
cused on Delaware in the months following the U.S. Supreme
Court's April 1987 decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America.5 CTS represented the most significant Supreme Court pro-
nouncement on state regulation of corporate takeovers since the
Court's 1982 ruling in Edgar v. MITE Corp.6 The CTS decision
appeared to breathe new life into state efforts to restrict hostile take-
overs through the use of "control share" statutes.' As a number of
states rushed to enact control share legislation,' the twelve-member
Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association (the Council) convened in an effort to articulate Dela-
ware's response to this new development on the takeover battlefield.'
The CTS decision sparked uncertainty and concern among members
of the Delaware Bar.
10
(1974) ("Indeed, Nevada has attempted to become the western Delaware but not with compa-
rable success."). For a history of Delaware's leadership in corporate governance matters, see
Arsht, A History of the Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1976); Kirk, A
Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: How Delaware Used the Federal-State System to
Attain Corporate Pre-Eminence, 10 J. CORP. L. 233 (1984), reprinted in 28 CORP. PRAC.
COMM. 115 (1986).
5. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
6. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
7. For examples of early analyses of the CTS decision, see Cherno, Supreme Court's
Decision Substantially Changes the Balance Between Bidders and Target Companies, IN-
SIGHTS, July 1987, at 3; States Flex Muscle On Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., June 1, 1987, at 1, col.
4; Pinto, N.Y.'s Takeover Law After the CTS Ruling, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 1987, at 5, col. 1;
Sorting it Out: State Takeover Laws Seen Revived by CTS Decision, id. at 1, col. 2 [hereinaf-
ter Takeover Laws]; Smith, The CTS Decision. SEC vs. the States, N.Y.L.J., April 30, 1987,
at 5, col. 1.
8. Two days after the CTS decision, North Carolina passed legislation requiring that
any outside bidder receive the permission of 95% of the stockholders for a merger, unless
certain "fair price" exceptions are met. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-75 to -80 (Supp. 1988). At the
urging of Burlington Industries, North Carolina amended this statute with a control share
acquisition law on May 13, 1987. Id. §§ 55-90 to -98. Minnesota adopted an anti-takeover bill
at the behest of Dayton-Hudson, a target of the Dart Group. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.671-
73 (West Supp. 1988) (control share acquisition statute and business combination statute).
Arizona approved similar legislation to protect Phoenix-based Greyhound. ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10-1211 to -1223 (Supp. 1987) (control share acquisition statute and business combi-
nation statute). See Mendelsohn & Berg, Anti-Takeover Bill Would Shift Balance of Power,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 41, col. 4; Expropriation at Home, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1987, at 24,
col. 1; States Flex Muscle on Takeovers, supra note 7, at 1, col. 4. See also infra note 47.
9. States Flex Muscle on Takeovers. supra note 7, at 35, col. 4. The Council had al-
ready established a Takeover Law Subcommittee, chaired by Michael D. Goldman of Wil-
mington's Potter Anderson & Corroon. See Sontag, A Takeover Law Grows in Delaware,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 19, col. 2; Goldman, Delaware Anti-Takeover Legislation Is
Needed, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 34, col. 1.
10. A letter from Michael Harkins, Delaware's Secretary of State, to A. Gilchrist
Sparks, III, Chairman of the Council, dated April 24, 1987, only three days after the release
of the CTS opinion, evidences the interest of the State:
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision on Indiana's corporate law
regarding takeovers, I believe that it is imperative that the Corporate Law Sec-
tion of the Delaware State Bar Association conduct a thorough review of our
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The concern generated in Wilmington and Dover by the CTS
decision provides the impetus for this Comment. Delaware's struggle
over takeover legislation has attracted national attention. To the ex-
tent that the Delaware General Corporation Law serves as a national
standard, the controversy surrounding such legislation illuminates
some important questions of policy in the waning years of the twenti-
eth century.
A particularly significant consideration is the manner in which
the decision-making process functions in shaping the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law. The process must respond to numerous con-
stituencies in order to keep Delaware "on top" in state competition
for corporate charters. The popular image of a small circle of law-
yers controlling the corporate destiny of the nation from a boar-
droom in Wilmington hardly commends itself to reality.
II. Some Background-on State Regulation of Takeovers
A. The Hostile Takeover: Boardroom as Fortress
In the past two decades, the mergers and acquisitions field has
emerged as a growth industry. 1 The statistics are numbing - in
own corporate statutes and present recommendations for adjustments that may
be necessary to my office for consideration in this legislative session.
Delaware has always been in the forefront of the corporate field. We con-
tinue to be a leader through a combination of judicial precedents and enlight-
ened legislation. Speaking for the Governor, the Delaware Legislature and the
Office of the Secretary of the State, you have our combined pledge that we will
entertain any reasonable proposal which will continue to keep our State as the
state of choice when incorporating.
I caution, however, against "knee-jerk" reactions to other states' attempts,
legislative, judicial or otherwise, to secure an advantage in the incorporating
field over Delaware. We have stayed on top in this business because we have
been cautious as well as enlightened.
Letter from Michael E. Harkins to A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, Esq. (Apr. 24, 1987), reprinted in
Cherno, supra note 7, at 7.
11.
Takeover activity appears to be the product of several factors: a stock mar-
ket that may price the shares of a company significantly below the value of the
entire company; the ready availability of junk bond and bank financing; the
strong desire for diversification, particularly by companies in industries with low
rates of return on investment; economic conditions that make it more desirable
to expand by acquisition rather than capital investment; the political and eco-
nomic fears of foreign investors; the large surplus of dollars in foreign hands; the
acceptability of the aggressive takeover created by the willingness of the major
investment bankers to act for raiders and the willingness of established compa-
nies to be raiders; and the ownership of a majority of shares of many major
companies in the hands of institutional investors, who are actively promoting
takeovers.
I M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.03 (1988) [hereinafter
LIPTON].
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1985, there were 3,165 transactions, with a total value of $139.1 bil-
lion."2 Of these transactions, 121 were tender offers and 43 were hos-
tile bids.' 3 The total value of tender offers in 1985 was $46.8 bil-
lion.' 4 While tax reform dampened takeover enthusiasm in the
second half of 1986,1" subsequent shakedowns in the financial mar-
kets may generate an unprecedented number of hostile takeovers as
raiders make their plays for undervalued targets. 16
The takeover game has engendered a jargon all of its own, as
bidders and targets constantly develop new strategies for achieving
12. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., COR-
PORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ECONOMY AND CORPORATE GOv-
ERNANCE 2 n.1 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVERS] (citing Almanac
and Index, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May 1986). These figures are comprised of leveraged
buyouts, divestitures, tender offers, and mergers and acquisitions valued at more than $1 mil-
lion, based on the effective date of each transaction. Id. Cf. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra at
2 n.j. (citing W.T. GRIMM & CO., MERGERSTAT REVIEW, 1985 (1986)). Grimm reported
3,001 transactions for 1985, an increase of 18% from 1984, with a total value of $179.8 bil-
lion. This value was 47% higher than 1984's record of $122.2 billion. For the first half of
1986, Grimm estimated that there were 1,528 transactions valued at $77.1 billion. By compar-
ison, for the first half of 1985, Grimm counted 1,563 transactions valued at $100 billion. Id.
The Grimm figures are based on the date of announcement of each transaction. Id.
13. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 12, at 2 n.1 (citing MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
July-Aug. 1986, at 55-56). In 1984, of a total of 3,064 completed deals, 142 were tender offers
and 33 were hostile bids. The total value of these tender offers was $42 billion. Id.
14. Id.
15. Deals Down in '86 Second Half. Uncertain Outlook for '87, CORPORATE CONTROL
ALERT, Jan. 1987, 1, 3:
[D]eals dropped from a high of 76 in the first half of 1986 to 62 in the latter
half. That is particularly surprising because M & A specialists report that the
second half of 1986 was much busier than the first part of the year. The biggest
dip was reflected in hostile tender offers, which dropped 18% from 56 in the first
half of the year to 46 in the second half.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom corporate partner Donald Drapkin
says that until the tax reform bill of 1986 was finalized in late September, un-
certainty over tax revisions may have led to the lull in . . .deals. In fact, in the
months of August and September, there were only seven contested tender offers
whereas in October, November, and December, after the tax law changes were
settled, there were 24.
George Hornig, vice-president of The First Boston Corporation, agrees that
the tax laws affected M & A activity: In the rush to complete deals by the end
of the year, Hornig suggests, some mergers, which might otherwise have started
out as hostile bids, were done as friendly deals to insure completion before year-
end.
Id.
16. See, e.g., Sontag, Takeovers Are On The Rise Again, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 8,
col. 4 (Edward 0. Herlihy of the New York law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz states:
"Takeovers will continue because the basic reasons that contributed to them have not disap-
peared. It is still cheaper to buy than to build."); Takeovers: A New Ball Game, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 27, 1987, at Dl, col. 3. (" 'A lot of people are buying things,' said a leading corporate
raider, 'and a lot of others are thinking of it.' "); Pickens Sees Plunge Spurring Takeovers,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1987, at D14, col. 4 (Corporate raider T. Boone Pickens states, "If
companies were attractive targets when the Dow was at 2,500, they will be even more attrac-
tive with the Dow at 1,800.").
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their respective goals.1 7  While most takeovers are considered
"friendly," the proliferation of "hostile" offers in recent years has
been a source of growing concern at the state and federal level. 8
Hostile takeovers are the stuff of which headlines and corporate leg-
ends are made; these takeovers are frequently accomplished by
means of a tender offer to a target's stockholders. 19
Martin Lipton, an expert in the mergers and acquisitions field,
has identified a number of factors that, singly or in combination,
may put glimmers in the eyes of raiders, and cause sleepless nights
for target directors and officers:
- a highly liquid financial condition, or readily salable un-
dervalued assets - such assets can facilitate a "boot-strap" ac-
17. The literature on corporate takeovers is extensive; for a thorough overview of the
subject, see LIPTON, supra note 11.
18. The principal takeover approaches include a "friendly" transaction negotiated with
management; a "bear hug," in which the raider notifies the target of a proposed acquisition
transaction; a "hostile" offer made directly to target shareholders, without management ap-
proval; and, as a supplement or alternative to these approaches, large open market and/or
privately negotiated purchases of target stock. LIroN, supra note 11, § 1.01[1]. For state
reaction to hostile takeovers, see generally New Directions in State Takeover Regulation: The
Second Generation Statutes, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (1986) [hereinafter
State Takeover Regulation]; for federal concerns, see generally CORPORATE TAKEOVERS,
supra note 12.
19. Note that the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 954 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)), does not define the term "tender offer." How-
ever, takeover specialists have developed a working definition:
[A] tender offer may be generally defined as:
A public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons
to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of
securities of a publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified
terms for cash and/or securities.
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973). While an
extended discussion of the mechanics of tender offers is beyond the scope of this Comment, a
brief outline of the cash tender offer process is useful:
The tender invitation or announcement advising shareholders of the cash
tender offer serves as the offeror's "prospectus" and is the basic tool employed in
the solicitation of tenders. As such, it is essential that the invitation contain all
the information necessary to enable any shareholder to evaluate the offer and
properly tender his shares. Where access to the shareholders list has been ob-
tained, the offeror can be expected to transmit copies of the invitation to each
registered owner of the target's shares. Arrangements will also be made with
broker-dealers to provide beneficial owners of securities held in street name with
the tender invitation. To assure maximum exposure for the offer, the bidder will
usually publish the invitation in general and financial newspapers of national
daily circulation. Regional or local publications may also be used where there is
some evidence of concentrated share ownership in a particular geographic area.
Invitations for cash tenders generally consist of three principal parts:
1. The basic terms and conditions of the offer;
2. The mechanics of tendering shares; and
3. The information required by Rule 14d-l(c) promulgated pursuant to
Section 14(d)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id. at 46-47 (footnotes omitted). For thorough descriptions of the tender offer process, see id.
at 46-63; LIPTON, supra note 11, §§ 1.03-1.07.
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quisition in which the target's stockholders are, in effect, paid
out of the target's own assets;...
- exceptionally high cash flow, unused borrowing capacity,
above-average return on net worth, or an imminent turn-around
from depressed earnings - all of which also facilitate boot-strap
acquisitions;
- a low price earnings ratio and high book value in relation
to market price - however, in recent years there have been a
number of raids on high quality, high multiple companies;
- undervalued assets (e.g., natural resources acquired long
ago), especially if conservatively valued for accounting purposes
and if their true worth is not reflected in the market price;
- a business that [the raider] knows and understands;
- no concentrated blocks [of stock] in inside hands - how-
ever, large institutional or street holdings are desirable, and
large holdings by estates or other fiduciaries, even if identified
with insiders, may create vulnerability;
- no antitrust or other regulatory problems - banks, insur-
ance companies, radio stations and defense contractors are par-
ticularly difficult targets, although it appears that regulatory
agencies and the courts are increasingly reluctant to interfere
with tender offers by requiring approval of transfer of control
prior to consummation of a tender offer;
- insiders with a low tax basis for their shares who may be
receptive to conversion of a cash tender offer to a complete or
partial tax-free merger [or an installment sale purchase of their
shares prior to or after a cash tender offer]; and
- a management that probably will not fight too hard - the
perception of management as "hard" or "soft" is one of the
most important factors in the selection of a takeover target."
As hostile takeovers create major corporate realignments on
what seems to be an almost weekly basis, a serious policy debate has
emerged concerning the merits of this activity. Proponents of the
game, as it is presently played, argue that the threat of a hostile
takeover serves to invigorate a management team that would other-
wise become complacent. 1 In the face of a challenge from a would-
be acquirer, managers who wish to retain their titles will man the
corporate bastion, improving business efficiency in an attempt to in-
crease the market price of the target's equity securities. Takeover
proponents also submit that takeovers promote economies of scale,
and facilitate corporate restructurings as an appropriate response to
20. LIPTON, supra note 11, § 1.03[2] (footnotes omitted).
21. See generally CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 12.
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changed economic conditions.22 Those who see a dark side to all of
this assert that the threat of hostile takeovers unduly diverts man-
agement attention from important long-range planning concerns to
short-term takeover defense strategies.23 In what may prove to be a
particularly prescient observation, critics observe that the wave of
takeover-induced restructurings has resulted in a highly leveraged
corporate structure, a situation that poses a significant threat to
long-term financial stability and economic growth.2'
The principal evil that state antitakeover legislation purports to
address is not the takeover itself, but rather the coercive nature of
certain types of takeover tactics, particularly the front-end-loaded,
two-tier tender offer. The classic two-tier scenario involves a bidder's
offer to purchase slightly more than half of a corporation's stock at a
premium over the market price.23 Once the bidder obtains a majority
of the stock, the bidder will subsequently "cash out" the remaining
minority in a "back-end" merger.26 This second-tier cash-out process
is perceived as unfair. Frequently the price offered at the back end is
less than that offered at the front end, or stockholders are offered
"junk bonds" in lieu of cash.2 7 Stockholder knowledge that the bid-
der contemplates a two-tier offer tends to create a herd mentality,
with the goal of tendering in the first tier of the offer in order to
avoid a later cash out on less favorable terms.28
22. Id.
23. See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1987) ("[T]he current wave of takeover activity has caused both raider and
target to expend resources on inherently non-productive activity. ... ).
24. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 12, at 14. See also Corporate Takeovers:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pts. 1-2), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
25. Lipton, supra note 23, at 18.
26. Id.
27. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (charac-
terizing two-tier offer as "a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into
tendering"); accord Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del.
1987).
28. For a discussion of target defenses to such techniques, see LIPTON, supra note 11, §
6.03[3]. See also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (upholding target
board's decision to declare a "poison pill" dividend of preferred stock purchase rights in re-
sponse to perceived vulnerability of target). "'[P]oison pill' generically refers to various defen-
sive measures adopted by boards of directors in response to takeover attempts or in advance of
possible takeover attempts that can cause severe economic repercussions in an acquirer or po-
tential controlling person." Dawson, Pence & Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus.
LAW. 423, 423 (1987). See also Helman & Junewicz, A Fresh Look at Poison Pills, 42 Bus.
LAW. 771 (1987) (discussing proliferation of poison pill plans in the wake of the Household
decision).
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B. State Takeover Regulation Prior to the CTS Decision
At the time of the Supreme Court decision in CTS,29 twenty-
nine states had some form of regulation concerning tender offers for
shares of corporations connected in various ways with those states."0
Many of these statutes are so-called "second generation" takeover
laws, which were enacted in response to the Supreme Court's 1982
ruling in Edgar v. MITE Corp.31 In MITE, the Supreme Court in-
validated the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, 2 holding that the Act
unduly burdened interstate commerce in violation of the commerce
clause.13 Three Justices also joined in holding that the Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act. 4 The Illinois statute required a tender
offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of
the material terms of the offer twenty business days before the offer
was to become effective. 5 During that time, the Act permitted no
communication between the offeror and shareholders, although tar-
get management was free to disseminate information to sharehold-
ers. 6 The Illinois Secretary of State was allowed to call a hearing
with respect to any tender offer subject to the Act at any time prior
to the commencement of the offer. There was, however, no deadline
for the completion of the hearing."7 In terms of buying time for tar-
get management, however, the Act contained a useful provision that
allowed Illinois residents who held at least ten percent of the target's
outstanding shares to request that the Secretary of State hold a
hearing on the tender offer. 38 Justice White noted that
29. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
30. Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State Tender Offer Disclosure Re-
quirements, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 664 n.39 (1987).
31. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , 1 137.51-137.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 954 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The Williams Act Amendments to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 were intended to ensure that investors responding to tender offers received
full and fair disclosure. See Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Takeover Bids: Hearing on H.R.
14475, and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , 1 137.54.B .E. The Act defined a "target company" as a
corporation in which Illinois shareholders owned 10% of the class of securities subject to the
takeover offer or for which any two of the following conditions were met: the corporation had
its principal office in Illinois, was organized under Illinois law, or had at least 10% of its
stated capital and paid-in surplus represented within the state. Id., 137.52-10.
36. Id. I 137.54.A.
37. Id. V 137.54.A-D.
38. Id. $ 137.57.A.
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[s]ince incumbent management in many cases will control, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, 10% of the target company's shares,
this provision allows management to delay the commencement
of an offer by insisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals
observed, these provisions potentially afford management a
"powerful weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." In enacting
the Williams Act, Congress itself "recognized that delay can se-
riously impede a tender offer" and sought to avoid it. 9
In White's view, that the Illinois Act allowed the Secretary of
State to consider the substantive fairness of the tender offer40 consti-
tuted an additional conflict with the Williams Act. Justice White
reasoned that in enacting the Williams Act Congress reaffirmed the
rights of investors to make independent investment decisions."1
The majority in MITE found the Illinois statute unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause."2 Applying the balancing test es-
poused in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,4 Justice White noted that the
statute's purported national scope, allowing the Illinois Secretary of
State to block any tender offer falling within the Act, was clearly
excessive in relation to the local interests served by the statute." Ad-
ditionally, Justice White could find no legitimate state interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders, and remained unconvinced that
the statute substantially enhanced shareholders' positions beyond the
provisions already embodied in the Williams Act."5 The MITE ma-
jority held that state securities regulation must survive a Pike com-
merce clause analysis; Justice White's preemption argument failed to
39. MITE, 457 U.S. at 637 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir.
1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
venue grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)) (footnotes
omitted).
40. The Secretary of State was required to deny registration of a takeover offer if he
found that the offer "fail[ed] to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees ... or that the
takeover offer [was] inequitable . ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , T 137.57.E.
41.
The Court of Appeals understood the Williams Act and its legislative history to
indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to make their own deci-
sions. We agree . . . .[A]s the Court of Appeals said, "[tihe state thus offers
investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy - an approach quite in
conflict with that adopted by Congress."
MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 494).
42. Id. at 643.
43. 397 U.S. 137 (1970) ("Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectu-
ate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." Id. at 142.).
44. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643.
45. Id. at 644.
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attract a majority of the Court.""
Although the Supreme Court's decision in MITE may have
closed the front door on certain forms of state securities regulation,
states quickly made an end run to the service entrance. 7 A common
thread among post-MITE "second generation" statutes is that they
generally apply only to domestically incorporated firms, conforming
to the traditional choice-of-law rule in corporate law. 8 In addition,
when a second generation statute requires approval of a transaction,
it is only the firm's shareholders, and not a state agency, whose deci-
sion determines the outcome.' As a final response to MITE, firms
may generally elect to "opt out" of the state tender offer regulatory
scheme. 0
C. CTS Validates Indiana's Control Share Statute
[T]he heart of this case is whether federal law bars the States
46. The opinion of the Court in MITE consisted of Parts 1, 11, and V-B, which included
the facts of the case, a holding that the case was not moot, and Justice White's commerce
clause analysis employing the Pike test. For the allocation of the Justices' votes in the complex
set of opinions in MITE, see Note, The Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes: Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REV. 1017, 1039-44 (1983).
47. The MITE decision has generated a substantial body of commentary. For a basic
bibliography, see State Takeover Regulation, supra note 18, at 289-90; see also Goelzer &
Cohen, The Empires Strike Back - Post-MITE Developments in State Antitakeover Regula-
tion, in TENDER OFFERS 49 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985); Sargent, Do The Second-Generation
State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause? A Preliminary Inquiry, id. at 75. For
analyses written shortly before the CTS decision, see Pinto, Takeover Statutes. The Dormant
Commerce Clause and State Corporation Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 473 (1987); Note, The
Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203 (1987). Four
types of statutes have evolved in the post-MITE era. These include: (1) "fair-price" provisions;
(2) redemption rights provisions; (3) control share acquisition laws; and (4) business combina-
tion statutes. "Fair-price provisions" regulate the second step of a front-end-loaded, two-tier
offer, typically requiring that shareholders who tender in the second or later stage of an acqui-
sition receive a price at least equal to the highest paid by the offeror within the past two years.
LIPTON, supra note 11, § 5.02[4] [d]. See also Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 117-20 (1987). A "redemption rights statute," such as that
enacted in Pennsylvania, mandates that the acquirer of a certain percentage of a firm's stock
must be prepared to buy out all of the remaining shareholders at a cash amount equal to the
fair value of the stock, which may include a control premium. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986) (30% threshold). See also LIPTON, supra note 11, § 5.02[4] [d];
Comment, The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitu-
tional? MITE Be, 89 DICK. L. REv. 401, 424-40 (1985). A "control share acquisition statute"
attempts to protect shareholders from front-end-loaded, two-tier tender offers by allowing
shareholders to evaluate the tender offer as a group, thus lessening the pressure to tender early
lest they be "frozen out" at a lower price in the second step of the transaction. See Pinto,
supra note 7, at 5, col. 1. Finally, "business combination statutes" seek to restrict mergers or
certain other business combinations between a successful acquirer and the target for a given
period of time. The New York statute provides for a five-year merger restriction. See N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1987).




from developing their generic corporation laws in ways that do
not restrict or regulate the purchase or sale of securities or any
other transaction in interstate commerce, but that may (depend-
ing on the intentions of a potential bidder) make a State's do-
mestic corporations less attractive as hostile takeover targets.5 1
The Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Chapter 2 is a classic
response to the Supreme Court's decision in MITE. Signed into law
on March 4, 1986, the Indiana Act applies only to "issuing public
corporations ' 5" incorporated in the State of Indiana.54 The Act de-
fines an "issuing public corporation" as a corporation that has:
(1) One hundred (100) or more shareholders;
(2) Its principal place of business, its principal office, or
substantial assets within Indiana; and
(3) Either:
(A) More than 10 percent (10%) of its sharehold-
ers resident in Indiana;
(B) More than ten percent (10%) of its shares
owned by Indiana residents; or
(C) Ten thousand (10,000) shareholders resident in
Indiana.
5
The Act is addressed to the "control share" acquirer. Under the
Indiana statute, "control shares" are those that would give their ac-
quirer voting power equal to or greater than any one of three thresh-
olds - 20 percent, 33-3 percent, or 50 percent.5' An acquirer's plan
for a would-be target may prove to be illusory, however, because
once the acquirer has crossed a threshold, his voting power can be
exercised "only to the extent granted by resolution approved by the
shareholders of the issuing public corporation." 5 The statute re-
quires a majority vote of all shares, "excluding all interested shares,"
in order for voting rights to attach to control shares. 58 "The practical
effect of this requirement is to condition acquisition of control of a
corporation on approval of a majority of the pre-existing disinter-
51. Brief for Appellants at 9-10, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.
1637 (1987) (No. 86-71).
52. IND. CODE §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (Supp. 1986).
53. Id. § 23-1-42-4.
54. Id. § 23-1-20-5.
55. Id. § 23-1-42-4(a).
56. Id. § 23-1-42-1.
57. Id. § 23-1-42-9(a).
58. Id. § 23-1-42-9(b)(2). "Interested shares" include the shares of an acquiring person,
and those of an inside director or officer of the issuer, which may be used to "exercise or direct
the exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of directors." Id. § 23-1-42-
3.
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ested shareholders." 9
The timing of this activity is obviously crucial to the acquirer. If
the acquiring person files an "acquiring person statement" with the
target, the acquirer can request a special shareholders' meeting for a
vote within fifty days of the target's receipt of the request. 60 If no
request is made, the vote on control shares will be held at the next
special or annual meeting of the shareholders."1 If, during the course
of this meeting, the acquirer's plans are defeated, the corporation
may redeem the acquirer's shares at fair market value, although the
corporation is not required to do so."
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,63 the Supreme
Court once again focused its attention on state regulation of takeover
activity. Dynamics owned 9.6 percent of the common stock of CTS,
an Indiana corporation. On March 10, 1986, Dynamics announced a
tender offer for another million shares of CTS.6 Six days prior to
this time, the Indiana Control Share Acquisition Chapter had gone
into effect; the Dynamics tender offer threatened to increase Dynam-
ics' ownership interest in CTS to 27.5 percent.6 5 Interestingly, it was
not until March 27, 1986, that the CTS Board elected to be gov-
erned by the provisions of the Act.66 Dynamics had previously filed
suit against CTS on March 10, 1986 alleging violations of federal
securities laws." When CTS sought the protection of the Indiana
Act, Dynamics moved to amend its complaint on the grounds that
the Indiana Act violated the Williams Act 8 and the commerce
59. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1641 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
60. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7(a), (b). The "acquiring person statement" identifies the ac-
quirer and purports to outline the structure of the acquisition plan. Id. § 23-1-42-6. The ac-
quirer agrees to pay the expenses of a special meeting. Id. § 23-1-42-7(a).
61. Id. § 23-1-42-7(c).
62. Id. § 23-1-42-10(b). If the acquirer has not filed an acquiring person statement, the
corporation may, if its articles or bylaws permit, redeem the acquirer's shares at any time
during the 60 days following the acquirer's last acquisition. Id. § 23-1-42-10(a).
63. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
64. Id. at 1642.
65. Id.
66. Id. See also IND. CODE § 23-1-17-3.
67. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1642. Dynamics filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court ruled that the Williams Act preempted
the Indiana Act and that the Indiana Act violated the commerce clause. Id. at 1642. See
Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. I11. 1986) aft'd, 794 F.2d
250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the District Court. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1643. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp.,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), affig 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. II. 1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1637
(1987).
68. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 89 Stat. 954 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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clause.69
Although the antitakeover statutes at issue in CTS and MITE
were substantially similar, the Supreme Court upheld the Indiana
statute and distinguished it from its ill-fated Illinois predecessor.
Finding no violation of the Williams Act, Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, stated that the Indiana Act "furthers the federal policy
of investor protection. '' 70 Justice Powell drew a distinct comparison
with MITE:
In implementing its goal, the Indiana Act avoids the
problems the plurality discussed in MITE. Unlike the MITE
statute, the Indiana Act does not give either management or the
offeror an advantage in communicating with the shareholders
about the impending offer. The Act also does not impose an in-
definite delay on tender offers. Nothing in the Act prohibits an
offeror from consummating an offer on the 20th business day,
the earliest day permitted under applicable federal regulations.
Nor does the Act allow the state government to interpose its
views of fairness between willing buyers and sellers of shares of
the target company. Rather, the Act allows shareholders to
evaluate the effectiveness of the offer collectively. 1
The Court was unreceptive to Dynamics' argument that the fifty-day
waiting period prior to a shareholders' meeting and decision on vot-
ing rights conflicted with the twenty-day federal minimum period for
which a tender offer must be held open. 72 "If the offeror fears an
adverse stockholder vote under the Act, it can make a conditional
tender offer, offering to accept shares on the condition that the
shares receive voting rights within a certain period of time."'7' The
Court espoused the argument that delay qua delay did not create an
inherent conflict with the Williams Act; as the Court indicated in
MITE, only "unreasonable delay" will disqualify a state statute .7
The Court in CTS rejected Dynamics' assertion that the Indi-
ana statute violated the commerce clause. "[T]his Act does not pro-
hibit any entity - resident or nonresident - from offering to
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1642.
70. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1637. Justice Powell was joined in the majority by Justices
Rehnquist, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred
in the judgment. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion which was joined in part by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens.
71. Id. at 1646 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 1647. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
73. CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
74. Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982)). See also 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)5 (establishing 60-day maximum period for tender offers).
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purchase, or from purchasing, shares in Indiana corporations, or
from attempting thereby to gain control. It only provides regulatory
procedures designed for the better protection of the corporations'
shareholders. '"" The commerce clause analysis in CTS focused on
Indiana's dual rights - first, to regulate the corporations that it
charters, and second, to protect shareholders who are Indiana resi-
dents.7" The basic distinction that the Court in CTS appeared to
draw between the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, and the Indi-
ana statute, was that the Indiana statute represented an attempt to
define shareholder rights in a takeover attempt, while the Illinois
statute effectively restrained the alienation of shares." Although a
share that is stripped of its voting power is certainly of questionable
value to a would-be acquirer, Indiana does not attempt to prevent an
"acquiring person" from making a play for an attractive target; no
one is denied a chance to roll the dice at the craps table of corporate
control. However, to the extent that an acquirer contemplates the
use of "loaded dice," such as the two-tier approach, 8 the CTS deci-
sion validates state action.79
75. Id. at 1652. One commentator opined that the Court in CTS viewed the statute as
"well-intended, benign, and favorable to shareholders." Cherno, supra note 7, at 3-4.
76. In a key passage, Justice Powell noted:
We agree that Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of
nonresident corporations. But this Act applies only to corporations incorporated
in Indiana. We reject the contention that Indiana has no interest in providing for
the shareholders of its corporations the voting autonomy granted by the Act.
Indiana has a substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from becom-
ing a shield for unfair business dealing. Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute in-
validated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations that have a
substantial number of shareholders in Indiana. Thus, every application of the
Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana
indisputably has an interest in protecting.
CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52 (citation omitted).
77. See Comment, supra note 30, at 669 & n.66.
78. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
79.
The Indiana Act operates on the assumption, implicit in the Williams Act,
that independent shareholders faced with tender offers often are at a disadvan-
tage. By allowing such shareholders to vote as a group, the Act protects them
from the coercive aspects of some tender offers. If, for example, shareholders
believe that a successful tender offer will be followed by a purchase of
nontendering shares at a depressed price, individual shareholders may tender
their shares - even if they doubt the tender offer is in the corporation's best
interest - to protect themselves from being forced to sell their shares at a de-
pressed price . . . . The desire of the Indiana Legislature to protect shareholders
of Indiana corporations from this type of coercive offer does not conflict with the
Williams Act. Rather, it furthers the federal policy of investor protection.
CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
DELAWARE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
D. Reaction to CTS
The initial reaction of the corporate bar and the academic com-
munity to the CTS decision was one of uncertainty. There seemed to
be little doubt that a control share statute might be a valuable defen-
sive weapon for a potential target, since it could provide the target
with a longer period of time in which to react to a takeover at-
tempt.8 0 A persistent bidder, however, might simply make offers con-
tingent upon receiving the voting rights of shares, launch a proxy
fight for control of the board, or undertake an effort to persuade
shareholders to adopt a charter amendment "opting out" of the stat-
ute.8 Noting the strong local ties required for a target corporation to
fall within the ambit of the Indiana statute, some observers felt that
while acquirers would shy away from "bullet-proof" local companies,
large national firms would not be similarly affected. 2
80. Takeover Laws, supra note 7, at 7, col. 1. Arthur Fleishcher, Jr., a partner at Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobsen, has commented, "Time is the great ally of the target. This
provision gives management more time to restructure, more time to find a white knight, and
more time to make various legal maneuvers." Delaware Plan on Takeovers, N.Y. Times, June
1, 1987, at D2, col. I.
81. Deleware Plan on Takeovers, supra note 80 at D2, col. i.
82. Id. Professor John Coffee of Columbia University stated:
For most New York Stock Exchange Companies, you will not find that percent-
age of shares or shareholders in any one state, with the exception of New York
or California. General Motors and Bank of America won't have that kind of
contact with this kind of statute; although there may be new statutes that may
go down the slippery slope even further.
Id. at D6, col. 3. See IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4 (Supp. 1986). Law firms expressed similar uncer-
tainty in their client memos. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher of Los Angeles believed that:
[slome takeover tactics, such as "creeping takeovers," and "street sweeps,"
would be radically restricted in states having such laws. It is important to recog-
nize, however, that the Indiana approach to the regulation of takeovers facili-
tates the ability of an acquiror to put its offer before the shareholders of the
target, and could, depending upon future judicial developments, lead to new con-
straints on the ability of a Board of Directors to maintain a target company's
independence. It could also enhance the opportunities for competitive bidding in
"friendly" transactions. It is possible that the Supreme Court's decision will
have the effect of validating tougher, more defense-oriented, statutes than Indi-
ana's. This is far from clear, however.
Cherno, supra note 7, at 4.
In a "creeping" acquisition, stock is acquired in small blocks to avoid SEC filings and a
public announcement of a tender offer. See LIPTON, supra note 11, § 2.02[2].
When an acquirer attempts a "street sweep," he seeks to take control in the market dur-
ing and shortly after a tender offer for the same class of securities. Stephen Volk, the head of
the mergers and acquisitions department at Shearman & Sterling, predicted that control share
legislation will cause acquirers to limit their open market accumulations to below 20%. See
Takeover Laws, supra note 7, at 7, col. 1.
While a target's use of a street sweep as a defensive tactic was approved by the Delaware
Supreme-Court in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987),
the SEC opposes street sweeps as a violation of the Williams Act. See Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d
945 (9th Cir. 1985). A proposed SEC rule would treat market sweeps similarly to tender offers
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III. "Delaware Is Flashing A Yellow Caution Signal.""3
A. Initial Reaction to CTS In Delaware
As members of the corporate community considered the impli-
cations of CTS, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the
Delaware State Bar Association began preparing recommendations
for the state legislature. 84 An early concern of the Council was lan-
guage in the CTS opinion indicating that Indiana's right to regulate
takeovers stemmed from something more than Indiana's role as the
target's chartering state.85 Justice Powell, in his commerce clause
analysis, justified Indiana's interest in protecting its resident share-
holders, stating:
[T]his Act applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.
We reject the contention that Indiana has no interest in provid-
ing for the shareholders of its corporations the voting autonomy
granted by the Act. Indiana has a substantial interest in
preventing the corporate form from becoming a shield for unfair
business dealing. Moreover, unlike the Illinois statute invali-
dated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to corporations
that have a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana.
Thus, every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substan-
tial number of Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably
has an interest in protecting.86
Any hint that a state's ability to regulate takeover activity might be
predicated on more than its status as the state of incorporation
would of course be anathema in Delawai'e.87 One leader of the Dela-
for regulatory purposes. Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activi-
ties Undertaken During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act
Release No. 24,976, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,160 (Oct. 1,
1987).
In New York, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom surmised that:
[w]e are likely to see a wave of "second generation" takeover statutes
adopted on the heels of the CTS Corp. decision .... In general, to the extent
they add more time, complexity, uncertainty and cost to a bid, these statutes can
be anticipated to result in fewer takeovers and in a greater tendency toward
higher priced offers to all shareholders for those offers that are made.
Cherno, supra note 7, at 4-5. A Debevoise and Plimpton memo to clients was somewhat less
hesitant, noting that "[w]hile the CTS decision clearly represents a victory for the defensive
side of the takeover process, it should not change the prevailing principle that to the highest
bidder go the spoils." Takeover Laws, supra note 7, at 7, col. 1.
83. Delaware Fails to Adopt Plan on Takeovers, Wall St. J., June 16, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
84. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
85. See States Flex Muscle on Takeovers, supra note 7, at 35, col. 4.
86. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1651-52 (1987) (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis added).
87. Delaware receives a higher percentage of taxes and fees associated with incorpora-
tion than any other state. Delaware Plan on Takeovers, supra note 80, at D2, col. 1. See also
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ware Bar moved quickly to characterize the "moreover" language as
"surplusage - it's not what the court based its decision on. The only
fair reading is that internal affairs should only be governed by the
state of incorporation." 88
In McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis,8 decided on September 16, 1987,
the Delaware Supreme Court defended the internal affairs doctrine.
The court recognized the traditional conflict of laws rule that "inter-
nal corporate relationships are governed by the laws of the forum of
incorporation.""0 The court also recognized that corporate directors
and officers, as well as shareholders, have a constitutional right to
know what laws govern the conduct of corporate officers.91 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court ignored the "moreover" language in CTS, fo-
cusing instead on the distinction that the CTS Court drew between
the Indiana statute and the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE.
While Illinois "purported to govern the internal affairs of foreign
corporations,"9 " Indiana "is merely regulating the internal affairs of
its own corporations," '93 and therefore, is not in violation of the com-
merce clause.94
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J. L., EcON., & OR-
GANIZATION 225, 238-42 (1985). However, while many companies incorporate in Delaware,
only a handful of major companies have their headquarters in the state. Sophistication, Tradi-
tion Mix in Wilmington, Legal Times, September 26, 1983, at 32.
88. States Flex Muscle on Takeovers, supra note 7, at 35, col. 4 (quoting A. Gilchrist
Sparks, III, of Wilmington's Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, Chairman, Council of the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association).
89. 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
90. Id. at 215. The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned,
[A]pplication of the internal affairs doctrine is not merely a principle of conflicts
law. It is also one of serious constitutional proportions - under due process, the
commerce clause and the full faith and credit clause - so that the law of one
state governs the relationships of a corporation to its stockholders, directors and
officers in matters of internal corporate governance. The alternatives present al-
most intolerable consequences to the corporate enterprise and its managers.
Id. at 216.
91.
With the existence of multistate and multinational organizations, directors and
officers have a significant right, under the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause, to know what law will be applied to their actions. Stockholders also have
a right to know by what standards of accountability they may hold those manag-
ing the corporation's business and affairs.
Id. at 216-17.
92. Id. at 217 n.12.
93. Id.
94. For discussions of the internal affairs doctrine, see Kaplan, Foreign Corporations
and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433 (1968); Kozyris, Corporate Wars and
Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1 (1985). Delaware may actually be in a stronger position to
regulate, on the strength of its status as the chartering state, than states that seek to protect
"pseudo foreign corporations." Such corporations may have extensive ties to a given state, but
are not incorporated in that state. See Takeover Laws, supra note 7, at 6, cols. 3, 4. This
problem was addressed in TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D.
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While defending the internal affairs doctrine the guardians of
the Delaware General Corporation Law appeared to be moving to-
ward their own control share proposal.9 5 In early June, however, the
Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar
Association decided against submitting a proposal to the state legis-
lature before the legislative session ended on June 30, 1987.96 Lewis
S. Black, Jr., a member of the Council, stated: "There were enough
unanswered questions and enough problems as to how the statute
would work in practice. Delaware is flashing a yellow caution
signal." '97
Black identified a number of questions that were raised in the
Council's deliberations.9 8 There seemed to be a general concern that
while a control share statute was designed on its face to protect
shareholders, various provisions of the statute could become powerful
weapons in the hands of clever managements or bidders. 99 Extending
the tender offer waiting period from the twenty days required under
the Williams Act' to the fifty days allowed before a shareholder
vote under the Indiana statute'0 1 might be intended to deter raiders,
but what sort of insurance is such a provision in an era of creative
takeover financing such as bridge loans and junk bonds?"0 2 Similarly
unsettled was the question of defensive actions that target manage-
ment could take during the fifty-day waiting period.'0 3 Since every
control share acquisition would launch a proxy fight, both the courts
and the SEC would presumably act as referees, defining limits to
which bidders and targets could go in advancing their respective
interests.° 4
Okla. 1987) (declaring unconstitutional the Oklahoma Control Shares Acquisition Act, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-55 (West. Supp. 1988), which purported to regulate foreign corpo-
rations having substantial ties with the State of Oklahoma).
95. See Delaware Plan on Takeovers, supra note 80, at D2, col. 1. The Delaware plan
was substantially similar to the Indiana legislation discussed in CTS. See supra notes 52-62
and accompanying text. Unlike the Indiana statute, however, the Delaware plan would have
applied to any Delaware-incorporated business that chose to adopt it. Delaware Plan on Take-
overs, supra note 80, at D2, col. 1.
96. Delaware Fails to Adopt Plan on Takeovers, supra note 83, at 2, col. 2.
97. Id.
98. See Black, Why Delaware is Wary of Anti-Takeover Law, Wall St. J., July 10,
1987, at 18, col. 3.
99. Id.
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
101. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7 (Supp. 1986).
102. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3.
103. Id. As Dennis Block of New York's Weil, Gotshal & Manges has observed, "The
whole question of whatever defensive tactics are taken during the 50-day period - restructur-
ing, recapitalization - will be litigated in state court." Takeover Laws, supra note 7, at 7, col.
1.
104. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3.
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The Council maintained a healthy skepticism concerning the
motivations of the players in the takeover drama. A bidder seeking
to put a target into play, or with the less noble goal of harassment,
need merely notify the company of an intention to make a control
share acquisition in order to trigger a stockholder plebescite.108 If
one takes a hard look at who would be voting in such a plebescite -
frequently institutions and arbitrageurs seeking the highest margin
of profit - there would seem to be few occasions when the bidder
offering the largest premium would not carry the day. 106 This is a
particularly important consideration for Delaware; firms incorpo-
rated in Delaware tend to have a higher percentage of institutional
investors than firms incorporated elsewhere." 7
The Council was also faced with the looming spectre of federal
intervention in the takeover game. Legislation was pending before
both houses of Congress that, if enacted, would have effectively pre-
empted key provisions in state control share legislation.108 Similarly,
105. Id. Professor James Cox of the Duke University Law School refers to this feature
as the "Boesky provision." In the Cox scenario,
[i]f a Carl Icahn or a Jack-the-Liquidator wants to put a company into play, he
can trigger a stockholder meeting. During the interim period of 50 days, the arbs
buy large blocks of shares that are seemingly independent of Icahn or Jack-the-
Liquidator but in actuality can be voted in favor of the takeover so that their
stock rises in value.
Delaware Plan on Takeovers, supra note 80, at D2, col. 1.
106. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3.
107. Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law,
65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 478-79 (1987). But cf. Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law
in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J. L. & ECON. 179, 184-89 (1985) (arguing that firms with large
proportions of stock held by identifiable ownership groups are more likely to prefer a "strict"
jurisdiction, as opposed to Delaware's "liberal" regime; empirical results for preferences of
institutional investors, however, vary depending on the type of analysis used).
108. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3. In the 99th Congress, 64 bills were introduced
relating to corporate takeovers. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note 12, at 5 n. 11. For hear-
ings and takeover legislation introduced in the 99th Congress, see K. WINCH & M. JICKLING,
CORPORATE MERGER LEGISLATION IN THE 99TH CONGRESS: AN OVERVIEW (Economics Divi-
sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Order Code IB85146, 1986). Dur-
ing the 100th Congress, the House considered a bill, sponsored by Representatives Dingell and
Markey, that would have extended the time an offer must remain open under the Williams Act
to 60 days. The bill would also have imposed a one-share, one-vote rule on all shares listed on
the national exchanges or quoted on NASDAQ. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG.
REC. H2540 (1987). On September 30, 1988, the Senate Banking Committee adopted the
proposed Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act. The bill, sponsored by Senator Proxmire,
stressed disclosure to shareholders as an integral part of the tender offer process. The bill
would also have lengthened the tender offer period to 35 days. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
133 CONG. REC. S7601-7603 (1987). See Subcommittee on Annual Review, Federal Regula-
tion of Securities Committee, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Fed-
eral Securities Regulation: Significant 1987 Regulatory and Legislative Developments, 43
Bus. LAW. 917, 923-29 (1988). See also Proxmire, The M & A 'Game' Is Not a Productive
Enterprise, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 21, col. 1; Shifts in Bill on Takeovers, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 1, 1987, at D2, col. 4. For criticism of the Proxmire bill, see Jensen, A Helping Hand for
Entrenched Managers, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 36, col. 3.
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the SEC might ultimately step in to prohibit any corporate action
that would unduly limit the voting power of shares."0 9 The Council
was troubled by the fact that the Indiana statute could be construed
as a license for "greenmail,""' a practice which would be curbed
under proposed federal legislation." 1
Finally, the Council noted that the Indiana legislation presented
a number of technical problems. For example, existing control share
positions were not grandfathered. If Delaware were to adopt such a
statute, it might inadvertently confiscate the control premium at-
tached to existing blocks."1 A further consideration was the ability
of a corporation to "opt in" or "opt out" of the statute - should
such a right inhere in the board, or in the shareholders? 1 '
B. The Delaware Decision-Making Process
The Council does not operate in a vacuum when it considers
changes in the Delaware General Corporation Law. Delaware must
be responsive to a variety of constituencies on any given corporate
matter." The question of a takeover statute is particularly thorny
"because in Delaware there are probably as many sharks as there
are targets.""1 5 This is more than mere speculation, since statistical
109. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3. This action would not be without precedent.
Following the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), permitting a target's discriminatory self-tender which excluded a raider,
the SEC enacted an "all-holders" rule, requiring that a bidder's or issuer's tender offer be
open to all holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer. See Amendments to
Tender Offer Rules: All-Holders and Best Price, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,873 (July 17, 1986).
110. "Greenmail" is a stock accumulation coupled with a proxy fight or takeover at-
tempt in an effort to force a company to buy back its shares from the acquirer at a premium.
LIPTON, supra note 11, § 6.06[2]. See Mesa Partners v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 A.2d 107
(Del. Ch. 1984).
111. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3. Senate Bill 1323 dictated that those who pur-
chased more than 3 % of a company could not receive an above-market price if they subse-
quently resold the stock to the company. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8 (1987). See also
Proxmire, supra note 108, at 22, col. 3.
112. Black, supra note 98, at 18, col. 3.
113. Id. The availability of an "opt-in" provision was to become a focal point in the
battle over Delaware's takeover law. Companies argued that such a provision would emascu-
late the law, since large institutional investors would vote against the takeover law's protection
in order to preserve their profits from takeover battles. Sontag, supra note 9, at 20, col. 2. As
enacted, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988) carries an "opt-out" provision, consistent
with the format of the Delaware General Corporation Law, "which sets standards to be fol-
lowed unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation or bylaws authorize a departure from
the statutory norm." Goldman, supra note 9, at 34, col. 4. See infra notes 121, 148 and ac-
companying text.
114. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 107; Romano, supra note 87; Romano,
supra note 47.
115. Delaware Plan on Takeovers, supra note 80, at D2, col. I (quoting Professor James
Cox of Duke University Law School).
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analyses demonstrate that manufacturing firms incorporated in Del-
aware have engaged in a greater number of acquisitions, averaged
out over firm lifetimes, than their counterparts in other states.116 Of
the firms that change their state of incorporation in order to engage
in a mergers and acquisitions program, more relocate in Delaware
than any other state.'
1 7
This is not to suggest, however, that would-be raiders can have
their way with the Delaware Legislature.1 8 In order to achieve its
success in the corporate chartering market, Delaware has had to de-
velop a corporation law "package" that is singularly attractive to in-
cumbent managers, the individuals who are ultimately responsible
for the incorporation decision. 1 9 The Delaware "package" includes:
(1) a highly developed case law that provides useful precedents and
substantial certainty about legal outcomes; 20 (2) a corporation code
that is convenient for managers and corporate lawyers; 21 and (3) a
degree of certainty that Delaware incorporation will remain highly
attractive to managers for many years to come. 22
116. Romano, supra note 47, at 140. See also Romano, supra note 87, at 255, 256, 263.
117. Romano, supra note 47, at 140.
118. Somewhat cryptically, Professor Romano has written, "In conversations with legal
and banking professionals, I was told that investment bankers frequently advise clients to
switch to Delaware for antitakeover reasons. But . . . survey responses do not uncover such
activity." Romano, supra note 87, at 275 n.72. T. Boone Pickens' eleventh-hour remarks on
the floor of the Delaware Senate in opposition to Delaware's takeover legislation excited great
curiosity, but had little effect; the legislation subsequently passed by a vote of 19-1. See Gilli-
gan, In Remarks to Senators, Pickens Raps Legislation, The Morning News (Wilmington,
Del.), Jan. 27, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
119. See generally Macey & Miller, supra note 107, at 484-91. Note that corporate
counsel and investment bankers also play important roles in the incorporation decision. Id. at
486-87.
120. Id. at 484. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Delaware Chancery Court: A National Court
of Corporate Law, DEL. LAW., Spring 1984, at 54. ("The Delaware Chancery Court has a
nation-wide impact and responsibility in shaping and defining corporation law, since it is the
tribunal of first impression that finds the facts and initially disposes of the cases." Id. at 57.)
121. Macey & Miller, supra note 107, at 484-85. Most sections of the General Corpora-
tion Law are "default" provisions that apply only in the absence of a rule to the contrary in
the corporate charter or bylaws; conversely, a corporation can "adopt" a rule in the Corpora-
tion Law simply by failing to provide an alternative. Id. at 484. An action prohibited under
one section of the Corporation Law is nevertheless permitted if the same action is authorized
under another section. See Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 365-68, 195 A.2d 375, 377-
78 (1963). The Corporation Law is also flexible in allowing managers to obtain substantive
personal benefits. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (1983 & Supp. 1986) (board can
fix compensation of directors); id. § 144 (director/officer transactions with same corporation or
another corporation); id. § 145 (director/officer indemnification).
122. Macey & Miller, supra note 107, at 488-91. Delaware "guarantees" the continued
attractiveness of its corporation law in a number of ways. Note that the Delaware Constitution
requires a two-thirds vote of the legislature to change the General Corporation Law. DEL.
CONST. art. ix, sec. 1. At the same time, Delaware is responsive to other states' innovations;
witness the Corporation Law's recent provision permitting Delaware corporations to limit the
personal liability of directors for breach of fiduciary duty. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(Supp. 1986). See also Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1989
One commentator described the CTS 23 decision as the product
of an ongoing battle pitting the SEC (supported by acquisition-
minded companies, securities firms active in the mergers and acquisi-
tions field, risk arbitrageurs, and Chicago-school economists) against
state legislatures (urged on by acquisition-resistent companies and
frequently, labor unions and municipalities)."" Delaware is in a pe-
culiar position with respect to this type of conflict; with significant
numbers of raiders and targets in the state, no one firm has the clout
to push takeover legislation through the state legislature.12 5 This puts
substantial power into the hands of the Council of the Section on
Corporation Law. 26
The role of the Delaware Bar as a distinct interest group within
the state has been a subject of inquiry. In theory, this group would
tend to support legislation that increases demand for the services of
Delaware lawyers. The portrait that emerges is hardly flattering:
The bar is small, discrete, and highly organized. Its members
tend to have a large personal stake in the subject matter of the
regulation. They also tend to be more wealthy than other groups
and to have good political connections. Indeed, many members
of the Delaware legislature are themselves members of the bar
... .[T]he bar can be expected to capture much, although not
all, of the gains from increasing the amount of legal fees gener-
ated by provisions of the Delaware corporate law. Accordingly,
the bar is a powerful political force pressing for rules that maxi-
mize legal fees but do not necessarily maximize the revenues
from corporations chartering in the state.127
Delaware and its corporate bar have "taken it on the chin" in the
Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399
(1987).
123. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
124. Smith, supra note 7, at 5, col. 1.
125. Romano, supra note 47, at 141.
126. As Justice Andrew G.T. Moore of the Delaware Supreme Court has noted:
There is, and always has been, a firm understanding between the General
Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware State Bar Association (now the
Council of the Section on Corporation Law) and the general assembly, that no
amendments to the general corporation law will be considered unless they have
first been studied, drafted and approved by the Corporation Law Committee,
then by the Bar Association generally, before they go to the floor of the general
assembly. That means ... that no one company is able to enforce its will on the
fabric of corporation law. For example, the DuPont Company, while closely
identified with Delaware, could no more go into the general assembly and at-
tempt to have the corporation law amended than could anyone else, unless the
Corporation Law Committee has first adopted and recommended it.
State Competition: Panel Response, supra note 4, at 780-81.
127. Macey & Miller, supra note 107, at 506-07 (footnotes omitted).
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past; that battle will not be re-fought here. 128 The claim that the
motivation behind any change in the General Corporation Law is to
maximize revenues for the bar is convenient for Delaware's critics,
however, the deliberations over control share legislation belie this ax-
iom. If the "goal" of the General Corporation Law is to generate
litigation profitable to the corporate bar, enactment of a control
share statute, given the many unanswered questions that the pro-
posed statute raised, would have provided an annuity for many mem-
bers of the Delaware Bar.12 The reluctance of the Council of the
Corporation Law Section to recommend "off-the-rack" control share
legislation suggests that greater forces are at play. Barring irate leg-
islative leaders rewriting highly organized drafts under new demands
and pressures arising from various constituencies, the Council's rec-
ommendations will be enacted. The Council is well aware that its
responsibilities extend beyond the immediate gratification of the cor-
porate bar.130
IV. Section 203 - The Controversy Lingers On
A. "Maybe We've Done Something Right."'"1
Once the weaknesses of the control share approach became ap-
parent, the Council sought a new focus for its deliberations. The
pressure for action increased when the Boeing Company, along with
five other major corporations, threatened to reincorporate elsewhere
if Delaware did not enact some form of takeover statute.13 2 In No-
128. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 4 (Professor Cary described state corporation laws as a
"race for the bottom, with Delaware in the lead." Id. at 705); see also Comment, supra note 1
("The sovereign state of Delaware is in the business of selling its corporation law." Id. at 861).
For more favorable analyses, see Arsht, supra note 4; Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1113 (1976). For recent perspectives on Delaware's domination of the market for corpo-
rate charters, see Coffee, The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the
New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 759 (1987);
Macey & Miller, supra note 107; Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law,
8 CARDOZO L. REv. 709 (1987).
129. See supra notes 80-113 and accompanying text. Illinois contemplated adoption of a
"clone" of the Indiana control share legislation; the "loopholes and inconsistencies" that a
Chicago Bar Association study group found in the Indiana legislation demonstrates that con-
cern over the soundness of the statute was not confined to Delaware. Such inconsistencies are,
of course, an invitation to litigation. See Position Paper of the Chicago Bar Association With
Respect to Amendment to Senate Bill 803 (Sept. 23, 1987).
130. Lewis S. Black, Jr. has characterized the Section's role as stemming from a sense
of "noblesse oblige." Black notes that "[i]n the long run, our best interests are served by
having good corporate law." See Sontag, supra note 9, at 20, col. 3.
131. Franklin, Drafting in Delaware. Bar Group Floats Controversial New Anti-Take-
over Bill, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 5, col. 2 (quoting A. Gilchrist Sparks, III).
132. Boeing anticipated a hostile takeover attempt by T. Boone Pickens. See Sontag,
supra note 9, at 19, col. 4; Barrett, Delaware Moves Closer to Adopting Law to Deter Hostile
Takeovers, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 41, col. 4.
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vember 1987, the Council circulated the first draft of a proposed
statute. 3  Modeled on New York's "five-year freeze-out" statute,
13 4
the proposed Delaware legislation imposed a three-year moratorium
on any "business combination" between an "interested stockholder,"
(i.e., a bidder holding more than 15 percent of the company's voting
stock) and the target company, unless one of several exceptions was
met.1 3
5
The draft legislation prompted an extensive debate in Delaware.
On one side were corporate officers and directors who saw the legis-
lation as deliverance from the likes of T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn,
and a host of other "raiders." Large institutional investors, which
generally opposed the bill, were joined by Pickens himself, who pur-
ported to represent the interests of shareholders against entrenched
managers. Pickens obtained support from corporate defender Martin
Lipton, who argued that the proposal's "barn-door size" exceptions
would make it practically useless. Lipton stated: "The takeover
frenzy burns as a wall of fire handicapping American corporations in
their competition with the Japanese and Europeans. Yet Delaware
fiddles with proposals that will exacerbate the problem." ' Some
members of the Delaware Bar took comfort in these reactions. A.
Gilchrist Sparks, III, chairman of the Council, mused that if such
polar opposites of the takeover spectrum as Lipton and Pickens
hated the bill, "[m]aybe we've done something right." '37
The debate over Delaware's takeover legislation was national in
scope,"3 ' and at times became acrimonious. 139 By its very magnitude,
however, the controversy belied the popular perception of Delaware
133. Barrett, supra note 132, at 41, col. 5.
134. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1987).
135. Goldman, supra note 9, at 34, col. 3. As originally drafted, the statute provided
that a 10% acquisition threshold would trigger the three-year freeze. See Franklin, supra note
131, at 5, col. 2. For a discussion of the statute as enacted at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203
(Supp. 1988), see infra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
136. Franklin, supra note 131, at 5, col. 2. See also Gilligan, supra note 118, at A 1, col.
4 (Pickens claimed that the proposed anti-takeover legislation would abuse the rights of share-
holders: "[aIll you are doing is insulating management." Id.).
137. Franklin, supra note 131, at 5, col. 2.
138. See, e.g., Sontag, supra note 9, at 1, col. 1 (Delaware Governor Michael N. Castle
noted, "Usually all we have to worry about are our little Delaware issues, and all of a sudden
we were getting all of this national attention." Id. at col. 2); Labaton, Debate Over a New
Takeover Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at Dl, col. 3.
139. The United Shareholders Association, founded by Boone Pickens and his wife in
1986, sent letters to Delaware's pensioners indicating (inaccurately) that their retirement ben-
efits would be reduced if takeover legislation was enacted. Chuck Hebner, Chairman of the
Delaware House Judiciary Committee, stated, "If you have to explain to enough people in
your district that pensions are not going to be cut, you get a little mad at the person who stirs
it up." Sontag, supra note 9, at 20, col. 4.
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as a fiefdom controlled by an inner circle of corporate lawyers. 140
When Governor Michael N. Castle signed the takeover statute into
law as Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law14 1 on
February 2, 1988, there could be no question that the legislative pro-
cess had afforded a hearing to the broad range of constituencies
competing on the corporate playing field. The judicial process would
ultimately determine if Delaware had kept that playing field suffi-
ciently level.
B. An Overview of Section 203
The Delaware takeover statute is designed to prevent an "inter-
ested stockholder" 4 2 from effecting a merger or other "business
combination"' 143 with a Delaware corporation for three years,' 4, un-
less one of a number of exceptions is met:
(1) Prior to the date the acquirer becomes an interested stock-
holder, the target board approves the business combination or the
acquisition of stock;" or
(2) The acquirer obtains 85 percent of the company's outstand-
ing voting stock in one transaction; 4 6 or
(3) On or subsequent to the date the acquirer becomes an inter-
ested stockholder, the business combination is approved by the board
of directors and authorized by a vote of at least 66-2h percent of the
outstanding stock not owned by the interested stockholder. 4
140. For a sampling of opinions generated by the proposed legislation, see Antitakeover
Legislation: Hearings on HB No. 396 Before the Joint Judicial Committee, 134th Delaware
General Assembly (1988). See also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
141. Act of Feb. 2, 1988, 66 Del. Laws 204, § 203 (1988) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988)). On Jan. 26, 1988, the Delaware House passed the legislation,
House Substitute No. I to House Bill No. 396, House Amendment No. 3 to House Substitute
No. I to House Bill No. 396, by a vote of 39-0. 66 Del. Laws 396, § 1 (1988). See Montgom-
ery, House Votes 39-0 for Takeover Bill, The Morning News (Wilmington, Del.), Jan. 27,
1988, at Al, col. 1. The Delaware Senate approved the bill on Jan. 28, 1988 by a vote of 19-1,
with one member not voting. See Humphrey, Takeover Bill is Approved in Delaware, Wash.
Post, Jan. 29, 1988, at Fl, col. 6. Governor Castle signed the legislation on February 2, 1988.
Court challenges followed almost immediately. See, e.g., Hays, Delaware's New Anti-Take-
over Law Is Contested by Campeau, Black & Decker, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1988, at 26, col. 3;
Takeover Law Tested, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1988, at D12, col. 5. See infra note 159 and
accompanying text.
142. An "interested stockholder" is defined in Section 203 as an acquirer of 15 percent
or more of the stock of a Delaware corporation. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5).
143. Id. § 203(c)(3).
144. Id. § 203(a).
145. Id. § 203(a)(1).
146. Id. § 203(a)(2). The 85% figure does not include shares held by persons who are
directors and also officers, nor does it include shares held by employee stock plans in which
employee participants cannot make a confidential decision to tender in a tender offer. Id.
147. Id. § 203(a)(3).
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The statute contains a number of other important "outs." For
example, stockholders may amend the corporation's bylaws to "opt
out" of the statute. 148 If the corporation's continuing directors who
were in office prior to a person becoming an interested stockholder
approve, or do not oppose, an acquisition by a third person who is
not an interested stockholder, any other party is then free to propose
and consummate a competing business combination." 9 Interested
stockholders must, however, be given twenty days in which to de-
velop competing proposals.15 ° Before becoming an interested stock-
holder, an acquirer may conduct a proxy fight and elect a new board,
which could then approve a stock acquisition or merger proposal free
of the statutory requirements. 15 Finally, an interested stockholder
may take control of the company without board approval and sell off
the assets of the corporation, as long as the proceeds are distributed
pro rata to all stockholders. 52
The goal of the Delaware statute is to prevent an acquirer from
using the corporation's own assets to finance its acquisition. 153 This is
achieved by the three-year moratorium on business combinations;
the moratorium can be avoided through prior board approval of an
acquisition transaction or, following on an acquisition transaction,
board approval coupled with a two-thirds vote of disinterested
shares.15' Discussing these two options, one of the drafters of the
statute has observed that "the former provides negotiations strength,
the latter guards against entrenchment."' 55
The statute reflects the board's position as a representative of
shareholders, a concept that has been thoroughly developed by Dela-
ware courts.1 56 Yet the board is not necessarily the final arbiter of
any offer. The statute provides a number of ways in which a poten-
tial acquirer may take his case directly to shareholders. 57 None of
these routes is particularly easy or inexpensive. However, the basic
tender offer process survives under the Delaware statute. Tender of-
148. Id. § 203(b)(3). A majority of the outstanding shares is required to amend, and the
amendment does not come into force until a year after the vote. Id.
149. Id. § 203(b)(6).
150. Id. § 203(b)(6).
151. See Goldman, supra note 9, at 34, col. 3.
152. Id.
153. Goldman & McNally, The Delaware Takeover Statute: A Report to the Delaware
General Assembly, in THE DELAWARE TAKEOVER STATUTE 8 (Packard Press 1988).
154. See supra notes 145, 147.
155. Goldman, supra note 9, at 34, col. 4.
156. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
157. See, e.g., supra notes 146, 147, 151.
DELAWARE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION
fers are neither prohibited nor delayed, and any acquirer remains
free to mount a proxy contest in order to remove incumbent manage-




Section 203 has passed constitutional muster on two occasions
since its enactment. 15 9 The takeover game rarely takes a time out,
however; new strategies are undoubtedly being mapped out in boar-
drooms across the country as acquirers seek to adapt to the Dela-
ware legislation.'
One of the primary strengths of Section 203 is that it forces an
acquirer to pay for the inherent value of the corporation.' 6' A recur-
ring theme during the debate over the Delaware statute was the co-
ercive nature of the two-tier offer. 162 Section 203 encourages a "fair
deal" for all stockholders; raiders will find it more difficult to capture
a premium between the offer price and the price realized in a subse-
quent sell-off of the corporation's assets.' 68
Delaware, the nation's leader in corporate chartering, has re-
158. Sparks, New Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law: An Analysis
7 (April 1988) (unpublished outline) (available in the Dickinson Law Review office).
159. See RP Acquisitions Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del.
1988); BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988). In RP Acquisitions
and BNS, the Delaware District Court applied the reasoning of CTS to Section 203, and
found that the Delaware statute was neither preempted by the Williams Act, nor in violation
of the commerce clause. In BNS, Chief Judge Murray M. Schwartz stated that "even statutes
with substantial deterrent effects on tender offers do not circumvent Williams Act goals, so
long as hostile offers which are beneficial to target shareholders have a meaningful opportunity
for success." BNS, 683 F. Supp. at 469. Both RP Acquisitions and BNS tracked Justice Pow-
ell's commerce clause analysis in CTS, concluding that: (1) the effects of the statute were non-
discriminatory, (2) the statute did not subject interstate activities to inconsistent regulation,
and (3) the statute did not place an excessive burden on interstate commerce when compared
to its putative local benefits. See Goldman & Walsh, Delaware Case Law Evolves in Wake of
Sec. 203, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 32, col. 1.
160. For a hypothetical that effectively illustrates the dynamics of Section 203, see Vea-
sey, Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and
Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAw. 865, 873-75 (1988). Martin Lipton, known for his defense of
various takeover targets, has voiced dissatisfaction with Section 203. Cohen, Lipton Tells Cli-
ents That Delaware May Not Be a Place to Incorporate, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1988, at B7,
col. 2.
161. Goldman, supra note 9, at 34, col. 2.
It is this value that a raider seeks to appropriate for himself to the exclusion of
the stockholders. Such bidders seek out entities whose true value exceeds their
market value. Although a raider's offer may exceed market value and attract the
tenders of arbitrageurs and other market professionals who seek short-term prof-
its, it does not equal the inherent value of the corporation.
Id.
162. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
163. Goldman, supra note 9, at 34, col. 2.
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sponded thoughtfully to the challenge posed by the proliferation of
takeover legislation in other jurisdictions. The reaction of Delaware's
bench and bar to the CTS decision was cautious and measured; on
the one hand, affirming Delaware's right to enact takeover legislation
by virtue of the internal affairs doctrine,"6 4 on the other, exposing
proposed legislation to the scrutiny of the Delaware Bar. 6 5
Delaware wisely rejected a clone of the Indiana legislation vali-
dated in CTS. The Indiana scheme abandons the concept of rea-
soned board judgment in favor of a potentially endless series of
shareholder plebescites; the effect in many instances is to allow insti-
tutional investors and arbitrageurs to realize quick profits as votes
are "sold" to the highest bidder. Section 203 of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law reaffirms Delaware's commitment to the prin-
ciple of board authority in a takeover context. Through the applica-
tion of the business judgment rule, Delaware courts will continue to
scrutinize a given board's decision-making process in the course of a
threatened takeover. 66 In less sophisticated jurisdictions, control
share legislation may be the panacea of the moment; shareholders in
Delaware corporations have been provided with a better reasoned al-
ternative through the diligent efforts of the Delaware Bar.
Peter L. Tracey
164. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. "The fact that a vast majority of
Delaware's corporations do not have their main office in Delaware or many resident sharehold-
ers does not prevent Delaware from regulating tender offers affecting these corporations and
does not inevitably create a risk of inconsistent regulation." BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc.,
683 F. Supp. 458, 472 (D. Del. 1988).
165. See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text. Following the debate over Section
203, some Wilmington practitioners have privately voiced the view that while the process of
amending the Corporation Law is now more public, the potential for politicization is also
greater; outside input does not necessarily result in better statutory schemes.
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
